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Human gambling generally involves taking a risk on a low probability high 
outcome alternative over the more economically optimal high probability low 
outcome alternative (not gambling). Surprisingly, although optimal foraging theory 
suggests that animals should be sensitive to the overall probability of reinforcement, 
the results of many experiments suggest otherwise. For example, they do not prefer 
an alternative that 100% of the time provides them with a stimulus that always 
predicts reinforcement over an alternative that provides them with a stimulus that 
predicts reinforcement 50% of the time. This line of research leads to the conclusion 
that preference depends on the predictive value of the stimulus that follows and 
surprisingly, not on its frequency. A similar mechanism likely accounts for the 
suboptimal choice that humans have to engage in commercial gambling. 
 
RESUMEN   
 
Palabras clave: juegos 
de azar, modelo 
animal, reforzamiento 
y toma de riesgo. 
En los humanos, los juegos de azar generalmente implican la toma de 
riesgo en alternativas de baja probabilidad y buenos resultados, sobre alternativas 
más probables y de resultados bajos pero económicamente óptimos (no apostar). 
Lo sorprendente es, que aunque la teoría de forrajeo optimo sugiere que los 
animales deberían ser sensibles a una probabilidad general de reforzamiento, los 
resultados de muchos experimentos sugieren lo contrario. Por ejemplo, los 
animales no prefieren una alternativa que en un 100% de las veces provea un 
estímulo que siempre prediga el reforzamiento por encima de una alternativa que 
provea un estímulo que prediga el reforzamiento en un 50% de las veces. Esta 
línea de investigación lleva a la conclusión de que las preferencias dependen del 
valor predictivo de los estímulos que los preceden, y no de su frecuencia como era 
de esperarse. Un mecanismo similar probablemente explicaría la elección sub-
óptima que los humanos realizan en los juegos de azar comerciales. 
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1. THE BEHAVIORAL BASIS OF HUMAN 
GAMBLING  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Commercial gambling can be defined as those 
forms of gambling in which the average net return is 
less than what is wagered. Such gambles are typical of 
casino games such as slot machines, roulette, and 
black-jack, and are especially true of lotteries. 
Commercial gambling is characterized by a low 
probability of a high payoff outcome in which the choice 
to abstain from gambling is associated with the more 
optimal, high probability low payoff outcome. Thus, 
when humans engage in commercial gambling they are 
making suboptimal choices, however, in spite of the 
poor odds of winning over losing, it is possible for one 
to justify the behavior in terms of the excitement or 
pleasure derived from the activity. Those who gamble 
often describe the activity as a form of entertainment, 
yet for those who gamble excessively, it can have 
serious effects on one’s career and family relations, not 
to mention one’s financial security. In fact, problem 
gambling is recognized clinically as an impulse control 
disorder in which people show impaired behavioral 
inhibition and a failure to consider the long-term 
consequences of the decisions they make (DSM-5, 
2013).  
In addition to what gamblers describe as the 
pleasure of gambling, most public gambling (e.g., 
casinos) when someone wins, it is more salient than 
when someone loses (bells ring and lights flash at 
casinos when someone wins big and big winners of 
lotteries are often mentioned on the news). This is 
sometimes referred to as an example of the availability 
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
Interestingly, examination of the behavioral 
ecology literature suggests that one should not find 
evidence of suboptimal choice in nonhuman animals 
because natural selection should have selected 
animals to be optimal foragers (Pyke, Pulliam, & 
Charnow, 1977; Stephens & Krebs, 1986). Given 
appropriate experience, nonhuman animals are 
presumed to be sensitive to the relative amounts of 
food obtained from different alternatives or patches 
(see Fantino & Abarca, 1985). For these reasons, one 
would not expect other animals to be as susceptible to 
making suboptimal choices as humans. 
 
2. A PIGEON MODEL OF HUMAN GAMBLING 
BEHAVIOR 
 
Pigeons have been found to prefer choices that 
produce discriminative stimuli over those that do not. 
Specifically, they prefer choices that sometimes result 
in a strong conditioned reinforcer (followed by 
reinforcement 100% of the time) and some-times result 
in a strong conditioned inhibitor (never followed by 
reinforcement) over those that result in weak 
conditioned reinforcers (both followed by reinforcement 
50% of the time) even though choice of either 
alternative would result in the same amount of 
reinforcement (see Fig. 1; Roper & Zentall, 1999). In the 
same study it was found that the pigeons were willing 
to work considerably harder for the discriminative 
stimuli than for the nondiscriminative stimuli. When 
working harder involves added pecking, it implies a 
longer delay to reinforcement and research on delay 
discounting implies that waiting longer serves to 
devalue the magnitude of reinforcement (Rachlin & 
Green, 1972). A more direct demonstration of the 
devaluation of reinforcement associated with 
nondiscriminative stimuli was demonstrated by several 
investigators (Belke & Spetch, 1994; Fantino, Dunn, & 
Meck., 1979; Kendall, 1974, 1985; Mazur, 1996; 
Spetch, Belke, Barnet, Dunn, & Pierce, 1990; Spetch, 
Mondloch, Belke, & Dunn, 1994). In that research, 
pigeons were given a choice between an alternative 
that provided discriminative stimuli, one associated with 
100% reinforcement and the other with the absence of 
reinforcement (each occurring 50% of the time), and an 
alternative that always provided a stimulus associated 
with 100% reinforcement (see Fig. 2). Although the 
results were not always consistent, the pigeons did not 
generally prefer the alternative that provided them with 
100% reinforcement and many of the pigeons actually 
preferred the alternative that provided 50% 
reinforcement. In a more recent experiment, we 
produced more consistent preferences for the 
suboptimal alternative by decreasing the probability of 
reinforcement associated with the optimal alternative 
from 100% to 75% reinforcement (see Fig 3; Gipson, 
Alessandri, Miller, & Zentall, 2009).  And in a follow-up 
study (Stagner & Zentall, 2010) we found that if we 
reduced the probability of reinforcement associated 
with the discriminative stimulus alternative, we could 
obtain an even larger preference for that alternative 
(Stagner & Zentall, 2010). Specifically, the probability of 
reinforcement associated with the discriminative 
stimulus alternative was only 0.20 (the stimulus that 
reliably predicted reinforcement occurred on only 20% 
of the trials), whereas the probability of reinforcement 
associated with the nondiscriminative stimulus 
alternative was 0.50 (2.5 times the probability 
reinforcement associated with the discriminative 
stimulus alternative, see Fig. 4). Under these conditions 
the pigeons showed a very strong preference for the 
discriminative stimulus alternative. 
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Figure 1. Design of Roper and Zentall (1999). Pigeons chose between two alternatives. Choice of one alternative (e.g., 
left) was followed by either a stimulus (e.g., red) 50% of the time that was always followed by reinforcement or a different 
stimulus (e.g., green) 50% of the time that was never followed by reinforcement. Choice of the other alternative (i.e., right) 
was followed by either of two stimuli (blue or yellow) both of which were followed by reinforcement 50% of the time. 
Spatial location and colors were counterbalanced. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Design of Fantino, Dunn, and Meck. (1979). Pigeons chose between two alternatives. Choice of one alternative 
(e.g., left) was followed by either a red stimulus 50% of the time that was always followed by reinforcement or a green 
stimulus 50% of the time that was never followed by reinforcement. Choice of the other alternative (i.e., right) was 
followed by a yellow stimulus which was followed by reinforcement 100% of the time. 
 
 
3. THE VALUE OF THE SUBOPTIMAL CHOICE 
 
Given that delay discounting can be used as a 
means of reducing the value of an alternative, in all of 
the research described so far, the time from choice of 
the alternative to the outcome (reinforcement or its 
absence) was held constant.  However, one way to 
assess the value of the discriminative stimulus 
alternative is to ask how much shorter the delay to 
reinforcement must be following choice of the 
alternative associated with the nondiscriminative stimuli 
for pigeons to shift their preference to that alternative. 
In this experiment we used a procedure similar to that 
described by Mazur (1996) in which the delay to 
reinforcement for the two alternatives starts out the 
same but is gradually reduced for the nondiscriminative 
alternative until the preference switches and then the 
delay to reinforcement for the nondiscriminative 
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alternative is gradually increased until it switches back 
to the discriminative stimulus alternative (Zentall & 
Stagner, 2011b, Exp. 1). In this experiment the 
probability of reinforcement associated with the 
suboptimal alternative was 20% and the optimal 
alternative was 50%. The results of this experiment 
indicated that the duration of conditioned reinforcer 
associated with the optimal alternative had to be 
reduced from 10.0 s to about 4.4 s before the pigeons 
began to prefer it over the suboptimal alternative for 
which the conditioned reinforcer remained at 10.0 s. 
Thus, it was not until the delay to reinforcement 
associated with the optimal alternative was less than 
half of the delay to reinforcement associated with the 
suboptimal alternative that the pigeons no longer 
preferred the suboptimal alternative. 
 
Figure 3. Design of Gipson et al. (2009). Pigeons chose between two alternatives. Choice of one alternative (e.g., left) 
was followed by either a stimulus (e.g., red) 50% of the time that was always followed by reinforcement or a different 
stimulus (e.g., green) 50% of the time that was never followed by reinforcement. Choice of the other alternative (i.e., right) 
was followed by either of two stimuli (blue or yellow) both of which were followed by reinforcement 75% of the time. 
Spatial location and colors were counterbalanced.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Design of Stagner and Zentall (2010). Pigeons chose between two alternatives. Choice of one alternative (e.g., 
left) was followed either by a stimulus (e.g., red) on 20% of the trials that was always followed by reinforcement or by a 
different stimulus (e.g., green) on 80% of the trials that was never followed by reinforcement. Choice of the other 
alternative (i.e., right) was followed by either of two stimuli (blue or yellow) each of which was followed by reinforcement 
50% of the time. Spatial location and colors were counterbalanced 
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4. THE ALLAIS PARADOX 
 
Humans often show a paradoxical choice 
behavior sometimes referred to as the Allais paradox 
(Allais, 1953) or the certainty effect (Shafir et al., 2008). 
For example, if humans are given a choice between a 
100% chance of earning $5 or an 80% chance of 
earning $10, although the average return on the 80% 
chance of earning $10 is higher ($8), most people 
choose the certain $5. That this choice depends on the 
certainty of the suboptimal choice can be seen by 
reducing both of the probabilities by one half (i.e., a 
choice between a 50% chance of earning $5 and a 40% 
chance of earning$10). In this case, the opposite 
preference will typically be found. According to 
expected utility theory, the results of the second choice 
should be the same as the first choice but they are not. 
The reason subjects often give for the preference for 
the certain $5 is they would be especially disappointed 
if they chose the 80% chance of $10 and lost, whereas 
in the case of the preference for the 40% chance of 
obtaining $10 they reason that they could almost as 
easily have lost had they chosen the 50% chance of 
obtaining $5. If humans choose suboptimally to avoid 
the possibility of a loss, could that also be why pigeons 
choose the alternative that provides the conditioned 
reinforcer that predicts 100% reinforcement over the 
alternative that provides a conditioned reinforcer that 
predicts 50% reinforcement? To test this hypothesis we 
conducted an experiment similar to that of Stagner and 
Zentall (2010) in which the probabilities of 
reinforcement associated with the conditioned 
reinforcers were reduced by 20%. As in the Stagner 
and Zentall study, the probability of reinforcement 
associated with the discriminative stimulus alternative 
was only 0.20, however, on those trials, reinforcement 
occurred only 80% of the time. Thus, reinforcement was 
no longer certain. To maintain the same ratio of 
reinforcement for the optimal alternative, the probability 
of reinforcement associated with the nondiscriminative 
stimulus alternative was reduced to 0.40. Thus, the 
probability of reinforcement associated with the 
discriminative stimulus alternative was now .16 
whereas the probability of reinforcement associated 
with the nondiscriminative stimulus alternative was now 
.40 (again, a ratio of 1:2.5). But once again, the pigeons 
showed a strong preference for the discriminative 
stimulus alternative (Zentall & Stagner, 2011b). Thus, 
the uncertainty associated with the conditioned 
reinforcer that followed choice of the suboptimal 
alternative did not deter the pigeons from choosing 
suboptimally. Of course, it is possible that if the 
probability of reinforcement associated with low 
probability high payoff stimulus was reduced still 
further, the pigeons’ choice may have reversed to 
become optimal. However, as we will see in the next 
section, certainty does not appear to be the mechanism 
responsible for suboptimal choice when probability of 
reinforcement is manipulated (Zentall & Stagner, 
2011a). 
 
5. A BETTER ANIMAL ANALOG OF HUMAN 
GAMBLING BEHAVIOR 
 
In all of the research cited, the probability of 
reinforcement was manipulated, however, when 
humans gamble, the alternatives generally involve 
different magnitudes of reinforcement rather than 
different probabilities of reinforcement. For example, a 
$1 lottery ticket might yield a much larger amount of 
money. It is possible that the effect we have been 
observing with the manipulation of probability of 
reinforcement occurs because the pigeons are avoiding 
an alternative that results in stimuli associated with an 
uncertain outcome (0.75 probability of reinforcement in 
Gipson et al., 2009, and 0.50 probability of 
reinforcement in Stagner and Zentall, 2010). If the 
effect that we have been studying with pigeons is a 
good analog of human gambling behavior, it should be 
possible to find a similar effect by manipulating the 
magnitude of reinforcement, rather than the probability 
of reinforcement, and removing the uncertainty of the 
outcome associated with the nondiscriminative stimuli. 
To test this hypothesis, Zentall and Stagner 
(2011a) gave pigeons a choice between two 
alternatives. Choice of one alternative on 20% of the 
trials produced a stimulus that always predicted the 
delivery of 10 pellets of food and on the remaining 80% 
of the trials, produced a stimulus that always predicted 
the delivery of 0 pellets. Thus, this alternative was 
associated with an average of 2 pellets per trial (see 
design in Fig. 5).Choice of the other alternative always 
produced one of two stimuli each of which always 
predicted the delivery of 3 pellets. Thus, the second 
alternative was associated with a consistent 3 pellets 
per trial. Once again, if pigeons are sensitive to the 
amount of food they obtain over time, they should select 
the 3-pellet option. Contrary to this prediction, however, 
the pigeons showed a strong preference for the variable 
2-pellet alternative over the fixed 3-pellet alternative. 
But perhaps pigeons were just showing a 
preference for the variable option (10 pellets 20% of the 
time) over the fixed 3-pellet option. After all, there is 
evidence that that variable schedules are often 
preferred over fixed schedules (Fantino, 1967; Hursh & 
Fantino, 1974). To test the hypothesis that the outcome 
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variability may have been responsible for the results of 
the Zentall and Stagner (2011a) experiment, we 
repeated the experiment and made the discriminative 
stimuli nondiscriminative. That is, choice of the 
alternative that provided an average of 2 pellets per trial 
now produced one of two stimuli, each of which was 
associated with a 20% chance of providing 10 pellets. 
The alternative that provided a consistent 3 pellets per 
trial continued to do so. Under these conditions, the 
pigeons quickly learned to choose optimally. That is, 
they now showed a strong preference for the alternative 
associated with 3 pellets per trial. Thus, it was not the 
variability of reinforcement associated with the 20% 
reinforcement alternative that was responsible for the 
preference for that alternative but the discriminative 
stimuli that followed that choice. 
 
Figure 5. Design of Zentall and Stagner (2011a). Pigeons chose between two alternatives that were distinguished by 
discriminative stimuli (a vertical or a horizontal line). Choice of one alternative was followed either by a stimulus (e.g., red) 
on 20% of the trials that was always followed by 10 pellets of reinforcement or by a different stimulus (e.g., green) on 80% 
of the trials that was never followed by reinforcement. Choice of the other alternative was followed by either of two stimuli 
(blue or yellow) both of which always were followed by 3 pellets of reinforcement. Spatial location and colors were 
counterbalanced. 
 
 
6. WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
SUBOPTIMAL CHOICE BY PIGEONS? 
 
6.1 Insufficient conditioned inhibition 
Although it is clear that the stimulus associated 
with reinforcement that follows choice of the suboptimal 
alternative becomes a strong conditioned reinforcer, it 
is not clear why the stimulus associated with the 
absence of reinforcement (the S-) that follows choice of 
the same suboptimal alternative does not become a 
sufficiently strong conditioned inhibitor (especially 
given that it occurs four times as often) to reduce the 
preference for that alternative. 
One possibility is that once the S- stimulus is 
identified, the pigeon turns away from it, thus limiting its 
effectiveness (i.e., it maintained little observing 
behavior; see Dinsmoor, 1985). For example, Roberts 
(1972) has shown that the effectiveness of a 
discriminative stimulus is directly related to the duration 
that it is observed. Consistent with this possibility, the 
pigeons in Gipson et al. (2009), Stagner and Zentall 
(2010), and Zentall and Stagner (2011a, b) rarely 
pecked at the S−, whereas in each of those 
experiments they pecked at all of the stimuli that were 
followed by reinforcement. Interestingly, however, 
Dinsmoor found that when pigeons were presented with 
an S− and they were able to turn it off (but turning it off 
did not change the schedule of reinforcement that was 
in effect), they did so. Thus, the S− stimulus did appear 
to have some inhibitory properties.  
To test the hypothesis that pigeons may have 
reduced the inhibitory effects of the S- stimulus by 
turning away from it, Stagner, Laude, and Zentall 
(2011) used a diffuse houselight as the S− stimulus. If 
the failure to observe or remain in the presence of the 
S− stimulus is responsible for the preference for the 
alternative providing less reinforcement, pigeons 
exposed to a diffuse stimulus that signals the absence 
of reinforcement should develop more inhibition to the 
S− and thus, should show a greater preference for the 
alternative associated with the optimal alternative. 
When we conducted this study, we found that the 
pigeons continued to prefer the discriminative stimulus 
alternative associated with an overall lower probability 
of reinforcement, and did so similar to controls for which 
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the diffuse stimulus served as the S+ (the conditioned 
reinforcer) as well as for controls for which neither the 
S+ nor the S− was a diffuse stimulus. 
Hearst Besley, and Farthing (1970) described 
more direct procedures to assess the inhibition 
associated with a stimulus that is followed by the 
absence of reinforcement. One of the procedures 
involves the presentation of a compound consisting of 
a known conditioned reinforcer (S+), together with the 
presumed conditioned inhibitor. Evidence for 
conditioned inhibition is found when responding to the 
S+ decreases when the S− is presented in compound 
with it. To devise such a test with the Stagner and 
Zentall (2010) design (20% vs. 50% reinforcement) we 
used a shape (a vertical line) as the S− rather than a 
color (Laude, Stagner, & Zentall, 2014). We then tested 
the pigeons with both the S+ and the S+/S− compound, 
first early in training before the appearance of 
suboptimal choice and again later in training after the 
appearance of suboptimal choice. To assess the 
generality of the effect, we used both a repeated 
measures design and a between groups design. 
Consistent with the hypothesis that the S− loses its 
inhibitory strength with training, early in training we 
found that combining the S− with the S+ resulted in a 
large drop in responding relative to the S+ alone, 
whereas later in training there was a significantly 
smaller drop in responding. 
Consistent with these results, a theory based 
on the absence of conditioned inhibition to losses also 
has been proposed to account for human gambling 
behavior. For example, Breen and Zuckerman (1999) 
reported that humans who gamble regularly have been 
found to attend more to their wins than occasional 
gamblers and less to their considerably more frequent 
losses. Similarly, research with humans has found that 
problem gamblers show reduced sensitivity to aversive 
conditioning (Brunborg et al., 2010) which should also 
serve to inhibit behavior. 
 
6.2 Reduced response cost associated with the S- 
stimulus.  
A different explanation for why pigeons prefer 
20% signaled over 50% unsignaled reinforcement has 
to do with the response that the pigeons make to the 
stimuli that follow choice. In the case of the suboptimal 
choice, the pigeons peck at the S+ stimulus but peck 
little or not at all at the S- stimulus. Thus, almost all 
pecking is reinforced. In the case of the optimal choice, 
however, pecking occurs on all trials to the stimulus that 
predicts reinforcement 50% of the time but that pecking 
is reinforced on only half of the trials. Thus, there is 
considerable nonreinforced pecking following choice of 
the optimal alternative but very little nonreinforced 
pecking following choice of the suboptimal alternative. 
This hypothesis suggests that the preference for the 
suboptimal alternative occurs because the S+ that 
follows choice of the optimal alternative has less value 
than the S+ that follows choice of the suboptimal 
alternative and because there is little pecking to the S- 
that follows choice of the suboptimal alternative, it 
contributes little inhibition to that choice.  Although this 
hypothesis provides a reasonable account of the data 
from Gipson et al. (2009) and Stagner and Zentall 
(2010) it cannot account for the results of the 
experiments in which the optimal alternative is followed 
by reinforcement 100% of the time (Belke & Spetch, 
1994; Fantino et al., 1979; Mazur, 1996; Spetch et al., 
1990, 1994; Zentall & Stagner, 2011a). 
 
7. CHOICE IS DETERMINED BY THE VALUE OF 
THE S+ STIMULUS 
 
If the inhibitory value of the conditioned 
inhibitory stimulus plays a minimal role in choice of the 
suboptimal alternative, then it must be the value of the 
conditioned reinforcer, rather than the overall 
probability of reinforcement associated with choice of 
each alternative, that is responsible for suboptimal 
choice. Thus, in the Gipson et al. (2009) study, pigeons 
do not appear to be choosing between 50% 
reinforcement associated with the suboptimal 
alternative and 75% reinforcement associated with the 
optimal alternative, rather it appears that they are 
choosing between the conditioned reinforcer 
associated with 100% reinforcement and the 
conditioned reinforcer associated with 75% 
reinforcement. Similarly, in the Stagner and Zentall 
(2010) study, pigeons do not appear to be choosing 
between 20% reinforcement associated with the 
suboptimal alternative and 50% reinforcement 
associated with the optimal alternative. Instead they 
appear to be choosing between the conditioned 
reinforcer associated with 100% reinforcement and the 
conditioned reinforcer associated with 50% 
reinforcement. Likewise, in the Zentall and Stagner 
(2011a, b) study pigeons appear to choose between the 
conditioned reinforcer associated with 10 pellets and 
the conditioned reinforcer associated with 3 pellets. 
This analysis assumes that it is the value of the 
conditioned reinforcer that follows choice, rather than 
the frequency of reinforcement associated with that 
choice, that determines whether the pigeons will 
choose suboptimally or not and it leads to in interesting 
prediction. If pigeons are given a choice between two 
alternatives, one which leads to discriminative stimuli 
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with the S+ occurring 50% of the time (and the S− 
occurring 50% of the time) and the other which leads to 
an S+ that occurs 100% of the time, the pigeons should 
be relatively indifferent between the two alternatives. 
Interestingly, there is published support for this 
prediction (Belke & Spetch, 1994; Fantino et al., 1979; 
Mazur, 1996; Spetch et al., 1990, 1994). Although 
generally it has been found that some pigeons prefer 
the alternative that provides 50% reinforcement, others 
prefer the optimal alternative that that provides 100% 
reinforcement. For example, Spetch et al. (1990, Exp. 
1) found that two of their four pigeons chose the 
suboptimal alternative more than the optimal alternative 
and Belke and Spetch found that two of their eight 
pigeons actually preferred the optimal alternative. 
However, what appear to be individual differences in 
optimal versus suboptimal choice actually may be 
influenced by an artifact present in the initial choice 
alternatives. In all of these experiments, the fact that the 
choice was between two alternatives that could be 
discriminated solely by their spatial location may result 
in a confound of schedule preference and idiosyncratic 
spatial preference.  
In a study by Stagner et al. (2012), we tested 
this hypothesis and the hypothesis that independent of 
the probability of their occurrence, conditioned 
reinforcers with comparable value would result in 
indifference between the two alternatives. In that study, 
pigeons were given a choice between two alternatives, 
one which led to discriminative stimuli with the S+ 
occurring 20% of the time (and the S− occurring 80% of 
the time) and the other which led to discriminative 
stimuli with the S+ occurring 50% of the time (and the 
S− occurring 50% of the time). That is, in this study, 
both alternatives were associated with conditioned 
reinforcers predicting reinforcement 100% of the time 
but in one case the conditioned reinforcer occurred two 
and a half times as often as the other. To avoid spurious 
spatial preferences that might be attributed to schedule 
preferences, to signal the two initial alternatives we 
used line orientation stimuli (vertical or horizontal lines; 
see Fig. 6), the location of which (left or right) varied 
randomly from trial to trial. The results confirmed our 
prediction. All of the pigeons were virtually indifferent 
between the two alternatives. To confirm that the 
pigeons were capable of discriminating between the 
two schedules, when the stimuli that followed the 
alternative associated with 50% reinforcement were 
made nondiscriminative, a strong suboptimal choice 
effect was found, whereas when the stimuli that 
followed both alternatives were made 
nondiscriminative, a strong optimal choice effect was 
found. Thus, the value of conditioned reinforcers play 
an important role in the suboptimal choice found for 
pigeons but the frequencies of those stimuli appear to 
have much less of an effect on schedule choice. 
Recently we found convergent support for the stimulus 
value hypothesis using a design more similar to that 
used by Belke and Spetch (1994), Fantino et al. (1979), 
Mazur (1996), Spetch et al. (1990, 1994), and others in 
which pigeons were given a choice between 50% 
signaled reinforcement and 100% signaled 
reinforcement. In this experiment (Smith & Zentall, in 
press) the main difference from the earlier research 
was the two alternatives were differentiated by 
distinctive shapes that varied in their location from trial 
to trial (see Fig. 7). Once again, in spite of the fact that 
the optimal alternative was associated with twice as 
much reinforcement as the suboptimal alternative, we 
found indifference between the two alternatives. As a 
further test of the stimulus value hypothesis we recently 
conducted an experiment in which only two terminal link 
stimuli were used (Smith, Bailey, Chow, Beckmann, & 
Zentall, in press). In Phase 1 of the first experiment, the 
initial link alternatives were each associated with 50% 
reinforcement but the predictive alternative was 
followed by a terminal link stimulus 50% of the time that 
was followed by reinforcement 100% of the time, 
whereas the nonpredictive alternative was always 
followed by a terminal link stimulus that was followed by 
reinforcement only 50% of the time (Fig. 8). Not 
surprisingly and consistent with the results of Roper 
and Zentall (1999), the pigeons showed a strong 
preference for the predictive alternative. In Phase 2, 
however, we reduced the frequency of the 
discriminative stimulus from 50% to 25% and in Phase 
3 to 12.5% and found no reduction in preference for the 
discriminative alternative. Thus, the pigeons preferred 
the discriminative alternative even though the 
nondiscriminative alternative provided four times as 
much food (see also Vasconcelos, Monteiro, & 
Kacelnik, 2015). In Experiment 2, we reversed the initial 
link stimuli that signaled the predictive and 
nonpredictive alternatives and returned the probability 
of reinforcement associated with each to 50%. Once we 
had recovered the pigeons’ preference for the 
predictive alternative we increased the probability of 
reinforcement for choice of the nonpredictive alternative 
to 75% in Phase 2 and then to 100% in Phase 3 (at this 
point the nonpredictive alternative was now predictive 
as well). Although the preference for the predictive 
alternative did not decline when the probability of 
reinforcement for choice of the nonpredictive alternative 
increased to 75%, it did decline when the probability of 
reinforcement for choice of the nonpredictive alternative 
increased to 100% but it remained significantly above 
chance.  
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Figure 6. Design of Stagner et al. (2012). Pigeons chose between two alternatives that were distinguished by 
discriminative stimuli (a vertical or a horizontal line). Choice of one alternative was followed either by a stimulus (e.g., red) 
on 20% of the trials that was always followed by reinforcement or by a different stimulus (e.g., green) on 80% of the trials 
that was never followed by reinforcement. Choice of the other alternative was followed either by a stimulus (e.g., blue) on 
50% of the trials that was always followed by reinforcement or by a different stimulus (e.g., yellow) on 50% of the trials 
that was never followed by reinforcement. Spatial location and colors were counterbalanced. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Design of Smith and Zentall (in press). Pigeons chose between two alternatives. Choice of one alternative (e.g., 
the plus) was followed by either a red stimulus 50% of the time that was always followed by reinforcement or a green 
stimulus 50% of the time that was never followed by reinforcement. Choice of the other alternative (i.e., the circle) was 
followed by a yellow stimulus which was followed by reinforcement 100% of the time. 
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Figure 8. Design of Smith et al. (submitted). Pigeons chose between two alternatives. Choice of one alternative (e.g., the 
plus) was followed by a red stimulus 50% of the time that was always followed by reinforcement or nothing. Choice of the 
other alternative (i.e., the circle) was always followed by a green stimulus which was followed by reinforcement 50% of the 
time. 
 
 
According to the stimulus value hypothesis, 
when the probability of reinforcement for choice of the 
nonpredictive alternative increased to 100% the 
pigeons should have been indifferent between the two 
alternatives because now the two terminal link stimuli 
had equal value, however, it is likely that carryover 
effects from Phases 1 and 2 of training could account 
for the absence of indifference. In any case, the 
frequency of the terminal link stimuli played little role in 
the pigeons’ preferences. 
 
8. THE ROLE OF THE TERMINAL LINK 
DURATION 
 
In all of our research (with the exception of 
Gipson et al, 2009) we have used a terminal link 
duration of 10 s. However, with any procedure in which 
choice of the optimal alternative is associated with less 
than 100% reinforcement, there is reason to believe 
that the longer the terminal link duration, the greater 
should be the preference for the suboptimal alternative. 
The reasoning is as follows: although lengthening the 
terminal link stimulus should make both alternatives 
less appealing because of delayed reinforcement, the 
immediate appearance of the predictive stimulus 
signaling reinforcement on some trials following choice 
of the suboptimal alternative should provide 
conditioned reinforcement, whereas the uncertainty of 
reinforcement following choice of the optimal alternative 
should have little conditioned reinforcing effect. 
Interestingly, even when there is no uncertainty 
associated with the outcome of the trial following choice 
of the optimal alternative (100% reinforcement) there is 
evidence that increasing the duration of the terminal link 
stimuli from 5 to 90 s results in an increase in 
preference for the suboptimal alternative from an 
average 17% at the shortest terminal link duration to 
67% at the longest (Spetch et al., 1990; Spetch et al., 
1994). Thus, terminal link duration, in addition to the 
value of the terminal link stimuli may affect preference 
for the suboptimal alternative. 
For pigeons, the value of conditioned reinforcer 
appears to strongly influence choice of the alternative 
that preceded it but conditioned reinforcers also appear 
to play an important role in human suboptimal choice. 
This conclusion is supported by a line of research on 
observing behavior which shows that humans will work 
to obtain a signal for reinforcement but not a signal for 
the absence of reinforcement when neither changes the 
probability of reinforcement. For example, Fantino and 
Case (1983; see also Fantino & Silberberg, 2010) 
exposed subjects to a mixed, variable time (response 
independent), extinction schedule in which in one 
condition, responses produced a stimulus which 
signaled that the variable time schedule was in effect (a 
presumed conditioned reinforcer) or at other times, a 
stimulus which signaled that the extinction schedule 
was in effect (a presumed conditioned inhibitor). In a 
second condition, responses produced only the 
presumed conditioned reinforcer (when it would have 
been in effect) and in a third condition, responses 
produced only the presumed conditioned inhibitor 
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(when it would have been in effect). Importantly, in no 
case did responding have any effect of the schedule 
itself; it only identified the schedule that was already in 
effect. Fantino and Case found that subjects would 
respond to produce the stimulus associated with 
reinforcement but would not respond to produce the 
signal for nonreinforcement, even though they both 
contain the same amount of information (i.e., a 
conditioned reinforcer let the subject know that 
reinforcement could be obtained, whereas a 
conditioned inhibitor let the subject know that 
reinforcement could not be obtained). The results of 
these experiments with pigeons and humans are 
consistent with the findings from human gambling 
research that conditioned reinforcers play an important 
role for problem gamblers (Crockford et al., 2005), 
whereas conditioned inhibitors exert very little control 
over the their decisions to gamble (Field and Cox, 2008; 
Franken et al., 2003; Holst et al., 2010; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974). The results of these experiments 
suggest that one approach to the treatment of 
pathological gamblers might be to make them more 
aware of their losses by making their losses more 
salient. 
 
9. THE IMMEDIACY OF THE TERMINAL LINK 
STIMULI 
 
According to the stimulus value hypothesis, 
indifference between the optimal and suboptimal 
alternatives results from the similar value of the terminal 
link stimuli that predict reinforcement (both 100% of the 
time). However, in spite of the indifference between 
initial link alternatives found by Smith & Zentall (2016) 
and Stagner et al. (2012) there is evidence that there 
are important differences between those two 
predicative stimuli. Using the procedure depicted in 
Figure 2, McDevitt, Spetch, and Dunn (1997) inserted a 
dark 5-s gap selectively prior to the onset of each 
terminal link stimulus. When the gap was inserted 
following choice of the suboptimal alternative prior to 
the onset of the S- stimulus, it had little effect on the 
preference for the suboptimal alternative, whereas 
when the gap was inserted prior to the onset of the S+ 
stimulus, it resulted in a large reduction in the 
preference for the suboptimal alternative. Surprisingly, 
however, when the gap was inserted prior to the onset 
of the S+ stimulus that followed choice of the optimal 
alternative it had little effect on the preference for the 
suboptimal alternative (see also Vasconcelos et al., 
2015). According to the stimulus value hypothesis, as 
both S+ stimuli should have had similar value, the gap 
should have similarly reduced the preference for the 
alternative that preceded it. McDevitt et al. (2016) 
reasoned that uncertainty enhances the value of the 
stimulus that resolves it. This account is similar to that 
suggested by Gipson et al., (2009) and Zentall and 
Stagner (2011a) who proposed that preference for the 
suboptimal alternative resulted from positive contrast 
between the relatively low value of the suboptimal 
alternative (50% reinforcement) prior to the appearance 
of the terminal link stimulus, and the appearance of the 
conditioned reinforcer, when it occurred. Alternatively, 
choice of the optimal alternative would not be expected 
to result in contrast upon presentation of the terminal 
link stimulus. Based on Fantino’s delay reduction theory 
(DRT, Fantino, 1969; Fantino, Preston & Dunn, 1993), 
Dunn and Spetch (1990) proposed that any event that 
signals a reduction in the delay beyond that already 
signaled by the choice response will function as a 
conditioned reinforcer. Their hypothesis also assumes 
that events that signal an increase in the delay beyond 
that already signaled by the choice response (i.e., the 
signal for the absence of reinforcement) will play no role 
in choice of the alternative that preceded it. McDevitt et 
al. (2016) refer to this explanation as the Signals for 
Good News (SiGN) hypothesis.According to both the 
contrast account and the SiGN hypothesis, it is the 
relative change in value of the signal for reinforcement 
that is responsible for the preference for the suboptimal 
alternative. Although both hypotheses explain why the 
signal for reinforcement that follows the suboptimal 
alternative would be preferred over the signal for 
reinforcement that follows the optimal alternative, it is 
not clear how that difference can overcome the inherent 
bias in primary reinforcement that should be associated 
with the optimal alternative. That is, the contrast or 
good news associated with the terminal link stimulus 
assumes that the suboptimal initial link alternative must 
be of lesser value than the optimal alternative. But if it 
is of lesser value, it should not be chosen over the 
optimal alternative. Perhaps it acquires greater value 
through its association with the terminal link conditioned 
reinforcer but if the suboptimal alternative acquires 
greater value, the increased value should reduce the 
contrast or good news that follows. The SiGN 
hypothesis overcomes this circularity by positing that 
primary reinforcement associated with the initial link 
alternatives and conditioned reinforcement associated 
with the good news are independent and additive. 
Thus, when the good news or conditioned 
reinforcement exceeds the differential primary 
reinforcement associated with two initial link 
alternatives, the suboptimal alternative should be 
chosen; however, when they are of equal value (Smith 
& Zentall, in press; Stagner et al., 2012) indifference 
between the two alternatives should be found. 
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10. THE RELATION BETWEEN HUMAN 
GAMBLING AND THE PIGEON SUBOPTIMAL 
CHOICE TASK 
 
Although there are differences between the 
procedures involved in human gambling decisions and 
the procedures used with pigeons, we propose that the 
underlying processes may be quite similar. That this 
task is analogous to human gambling would be better 
supported if one could show that the performance by 
humans on a similar task was correlated with the 
degree to which those individuals engaged in gambling 
behavior. Using a modified version of the pigeon task 
used by Zentall and Stagner (2011a), Molet et al. 
(2012) tested this prediction and found that humans 
who self-reported that they regularly engaged in 
commercial gambling, chose the suboptimal alternative 
significantly more than nongamblers. The results of this 
experiment suggest that mechanisms found to be 
involved in suboptimal choice by pigeons may also be 
relevant to human gambling. 
 
10.1 Task Differences 
When humans gamble, one can think of the 
choice as go/no-go because humans can choose to 
gamble with money that they have or refrain from 
gambling. Pigeons, on the other hand, choose between 
an optimal outcome and a suboptimal outcome, both of 
which involve obtaining resources that they do not 
already have. Although different, this distinction should 
make it even more likely that humans would not gamble 
because for humans, not only do they have a choice 
between a sure outcome and a probabilistic outcome 
but the sure outcome is immediate (money already in 
their pocket) whereas the probabilistic outcome is 
delayed by the time it takes to gamble and learn about 
the outcome. This may explain why only a small 
percentage of humans are actually problem gamblers. 
In fact, we have found that for pigeons, if the suboptimal 
outcome is delayed, relative to the optimal outcome, the 
pigeons begin to choose optimally (Zentall and Stagner, 
2011b, Exp. 1). Because humans choose to gamble 
with money that they already have, unlike pigeons their 
losses represent actual losses rather than the absence 
of reinforcement. This distinction may be important 
because according to prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky,1979), although gains that are certain (e.g., the 
certainty of winning $5) are preferred over 
proportionally larger gains that are probabilistic (e.g., an 
80% chance of winning $10) (the certainty effect), 
losses that are certain (e.g., the certainty of losing $5) 
are avoided over proportionally larger losses that are 
probabilistic (e.g., an 80% chance of losing $10) (the 
reflection effect). That is, there is a stronger bias to win 
back losses than to obtain gains, an effect that typically 
encourages gamblers to keep gambling. Although it 
would be difficult to create a task in which pigeons, like 
humans, can choose to gamble with a reinforcer that 
they already have, as already noted, although gains 
that are certain we have tested humans who are self-
reported gamblers on a version of the pigeon two-
alternative choice task and found that they are more 
likely to choose suboptimally than self-reported non 
gamblers (Molet et al., 2012). Thus, the difference 
between the go/no-go choice provided by commercial 
gambling and the two-alternative choice provided by 
our analog task does not appear to be responsible for 
the suboptimal choice by pigeons. 
 
10.2 The role of conditioned reinforces in human 
gambling.  
The suboptimal choice task used with pigeons 
involves the appearance of conditioned reinforcers 
following choice but prior to the appearance of the 
outcome. To what extent are there analogous 
conditioned reinforcers present in human gambling? It 
may not be obvious that conditioned reinforcers are 
present in human gambling but the results of a thought 
experiment suggest that they are. For example, the 
three reels on a slot machine can be thought of as 
conditioned reinforcers. Evidence that they serve that 
role is suggested by the likelihood that people would not 
likely gamble nearly as much if the reels on the slot 
machine could not be seen. That is, if the only outcome 
of money inserted in the machine would be either 
nothing or money falling into the coin tray. Once again, 
under these conditions people would be less likely to 
play. A similar argument can be made for other games 
of chance (e.g., roulette and blackjack). Thus, although 
there may be some procedural differences between the 
pigeon suboptimal choice task and human commercial 
gambling, the important elements of the two are quite 
similar as supported by the finding that a modified 
version of the pigeon task is able to distinguish human 
gambler from nongamblers (Molet et al., 2012). 
 
11. THE NEAR HIT EFFECT 
 
One way in which pigeons appear to differ from 
humans in their preference for the suboptimal 
alternative is in the effect of outcomes that indicate a 
loss but appear to come close to winning, a near hit 
(sometimes referred to as a near miss). An example of 
a near hit outcome can best be described using a three-
reel slot machine. A winning outcome consist of lining 
up three of the same symbols, one on each reel (e.g., 
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three cherries). Any mixture of different symbols 
represents a loss but some losses are not viewed as 
bad by gamblers as others. For example, two cherries 
and a bell represent a loss but that combination 
appears to many gamblers to be closer to a winning 
outcome than a clear loss of three symbols that do not 
match (Reid, 1986). When MacLin, Dixon, Daugherty, 
and Small (2007) gave subjects a choice among three 
machines, one that gave near hit trials 45% of the time, 
another that gave near hits 30% of the time, and the 
third that gave near hits 15% of the time, they preferred 
the machine that gave near hit trials most often. Griffiths 
(1999) proposed that near hits encourage further game 
play because even though gamblers are still losing, 
“they must be doing something right.” Langer (1975) 
proposed that the near hit gave gamblers the illusion of 
control. That is, getting close to winning suggests that 
there may be skill involved in this game of chance. In 
games involving skill, such as shooting basket balls, 
near hits can provide feedback on how to modify 
behavior on the next trial but not in games of chance. 
Commercial gambling systems sometimes take 
advantage of the perceived value in coming close to 
winning by programming machines to provide more of 
these near hits to encourage further play.  
Although there is some suggestion that rats 
may also show a preference for near hit trials 
(Winstanley, Cocker, & Rogers, 2011), the effect 
appeared to be one of stimulus generalization. That is, 
if three successive lights signaled a win (111), the rats 
responded equally to two lights irrespective of their 
order (i.e., they responded equally to 110, 101, and 
011). For humans 110 would be considered a near hit, 
whereas 101 and 011 would be considered clear loss.  
Recently, Stagner, Case, Sticklen, Duncan, 
and Zentall (2015) asked if pigeons preferred near hit 
trials over clear loss trials when the probability of 
reinforcement was equated (see Fig. 9). Not only did 
they find that pigeons preferred clear loss trials over 
near hit trials, but they also found that the later in the 
terminal link that the near hit occurred, the less they 
preferred the alternative with the near hit trials (Stagner 
et al., Exp. 2). In a follow-up experiment (Stagner et al., 
Exp. 3), to model the initial uncertainty of the outcome 
on loss trials with the three reel slot machine, choice of 
the near hit alternative was followed by a neutral 
stimulus that revealed the S+ or S- stimulus during the 
last 2 s of the terminal link. Once again, with the 
probability of reinforcement equated for the two 
alternatives, the pigeons preferred the alternative that 
provided them with clear losses over the alternative that 
provided them with near hits.  
 
Figure 9. Design of Stagner et al. (2015). Pigeons chose between two alternatives. Choice of one alternative (e.g., the 
plus) was followed by a red stimulus 50% of the time that was always followed by reinforcement, or a red stimulus 25% of 
the time that after 5 s changed to green and was never followed by reinforcement (the near hit outcome), or a green 
stimulus 25% of the time that was never followed by reinforcement (the clear loss outcome). Choice of the other 
alternative (e.g., the circle) was followed by either a blue stimulus 50% of the time that was always followed by 
reinforcement or a yellow stimulus 50% of the time that was never followed by reinforcement (the clear loss outcome). 
Thus, both alternatives were associated with 50% reinforcement. 
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It is interesting to speculate as to why humans 
are different in this respect from pigeons. Several 
authors have suggested that the attraction to the near 
hit by humans comes from the illusion that a near hit is 
closer to a hit than is a loss (Griffiths, 1999; Reid, 1986) 
and Langer (1975) proposed that the near hit gives 
gamblers the illusion of control. After all, in many games 
of skill, getting closer to success does represent 
improvement in the skill. Apparently, pigeons do not 
suffer from this illusion, or at least they do not suffer 
from this illusion with this task, in which a near hit does 
not indicate that one getting closer to a win, because 
the outcomes are totally probabalistic.  
The preference for near hit outcomes by 
humans may result from the large number of skill tasks 
in which humans tend to engage (Stagner et al., 2015). 
It would be interesting to know if giving an animal a 
large number of skill tasks in which getting close to 
success represents a higher probability of success 
might alter an animal’s avoidance of near-hit outcomes 
in tasks in which skill plays no role.  
 
12. THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF SUBOPTIMAL 
CHOICE AND HUMAN GAMBLING  
 
12.1 The Relation Between Level of Food 
Restriction and Suboptimal Choice.  
Although humans often describe gambling as a 
form of entertainment, the fact that people with higher 
needs (those of lower socio-economic status) tend to 
gamble proportionally more than those with lower 
needs (those of higher status) (Lyk-Jensen, 2010; 
Worthington, 2001) suggests that this is not the primary 
motivation for gambling. If the pigeon model of 
suboptimal choice is an analog of human gambling, 
then one might expect the level of pigeons’ food 
motivation be associated with their degree of 
suboptimal choice. Laude et al. (2012) found support 
for the relationship. They found that pigeons that were 
normally food restricted showed the typical suboptimal 
choice, whereas those that were minimally food 
restricted tended to choose optimally. 
 
12.2 The Relation Between Impulsivity and 
Suboptimal Choice. 
 It has been proposed that the mechanism 
responsible for the suboptimal choice involved in 
gambling is likely to be impulsivity (Michalczuk et al., 
2011; Nower and Blaszczynski, 2006). Impulsivity can 
defined as the inability to delay reinforcement and it has 
been assessed by way of delay discounting tasks in 
which an organism is given a choice between a small 
immediate reinforcement and a larger delayed 
reinforcement. The delay at which the organism is 
indifferent between the two alternatives defines the 
slope of the discounting function and the degree of 
impulsivity. Thus, impulsive individuals require that the 
delay to the larger amount of reinforcement be relatively 
short before they will prefer it and for them the slope of 
the discounting function would be relatively steep. We 
have recently found that the slope of the delay 
discounting function for pigeons is a good predictor of 
the degree to which they prefer the suboptimal choice 
in the gambling-like task (Laude et al., 2014). Thus, 
impulsivity appears to be related to suboptimal choice 
for pigeons as well. 
 
12.3 The Relation Between Housing and 
Suboptimal Choice.  
There is some suggestion from research with 
rats that various extra-experimental environmental 
factors such as social and physical enrichment can 
affect a rat’s propensity to self-administer drugs of 
addiction (Stairs & Bardo, 2009). Rats that are housed 
in an enriched group environment (a large cage with 
other rats and objects that are replaced regularly) show 
a significantly reduced tendency to self-administer 
drugs than rats that are normally (individually) housed. 
The mechanism responsible for the reduced self-
administration of drugs by environmental enrichment 
has been hypothesized to be a reduction in impulsive 
behavior (Perry & Carroll, 2008) as well as the reduced 
effectiveness of conditioned reinforcers (Jones, 
Marsden, & Robbins, 1990). Impulsivity has also been 
implicated in human gambling behavior (Steel & 
Blaszczynski, 1998) and, as already noted, conditioned 
reinforcement has been proposed to account for 
suboptimal choice by animals (Dinsmoor, 1983). 
Furthermore, there is evidence that similar 
physiological mechanisms underlie compulsive 
gambling and drug addiction (Potenza, 2008).  
In an attempt to determine the effect of housing 
conditions on suboptimal choice, we gave one group of 
pigeons experience in an enriched environment (a large 
cage with four other pigeons for 4 h a day), while the 
control pigeons remained in their normal one-to-a-cage 
housing (Pattison, Laude, & Zentall, 2013). When we 
exposed the pigeons from both groups to the gambling-
like suboptimal choice task we found that the normally 
housed pigeons showed the typical suboptimal choice, 
whereas the enriched pigeons showed a significantly 
delayed choice of the suboptimal alternative. Thus, 
enriched housing, even for a relatively short 4-h a day, 
appears to retard the development of suboptimal 
choice. This finding has implications for the treatment 
of problem gambling behavior by humans. It implies 
that exposing human gamblers to an environment that 
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is socially and physically enriched may reduce the 
attraction of gambling. 
 
13. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The suboptimal choice task provides a 
reasonable analog to human commercial gambling 
behavior. The mechanisms responsible for this 
behavior appear to be the relative lack of effectiveness 
of losses (nonreinforcement) in reducing the tendency 
to choose the suboptimal alternative, even when the 
losses occur on almost every trial (Smith & Zentall, in 
press; Stagner & Zentall, 2011; Vasconcelos et al., 
2015). Furthermore, the relative probability of 
reinforcement associated with the two initial link 
alternatives appears to be relatively unimportant. 
Instead, the predictive value of the terminal link stimuli 
appears to be the primary determinant of initial link 
preference. Similarly, for most humans who gamble, it 
is the potential outcome for winning rather than the 
odds of winning that influences the tendency to gamble. 
Interestingly, for pigeons, increasing the 
motivation to obtain reinforcement actually increases 
the tendency to choose suboptimally and thus obtain 
less food. Furthermore, providing pigeons with a 
somewhat enriched environment results in a significant 
reduction in the acquisition of suboptimal choice, a 
result that may have implications for the treatment of 
human problem gambling. Thus, the animal suboptimal 
choice task may provide a useful model to understand 
the mechanisms and treatment of human gambling 
behavior. 
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